Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

F
rom humble beginnings in 1975 as a small program designed to offset the payroll taxes paid by low income workers, the Earned Income Credit (EIC) has grown into a major income support program. In 1996, the EIC transferred a total of $28.8 billion to over 19 million families (IRS, 1998) .
In contrast to social programs that transfer benefits evenly over the calendar year, including Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamps (FS), and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the great majority of EIC benefits are paid during the tax filing period in the calendar year following the year of eligibility. Most EIC benefits are paid in one of two forms: reductions in tax liability that accrue to recipients when taxes are paid (between January 1 st and April 15 th ) or increases in tax refunds that accrue when refunds are received (between the end of January and the end of May). As a result, the one-time payment received is larger than the periodic payments of other income support programs. For example, while the average EIC refund among recipients receiving refunds in 1996 was slightly over $1,500, the average AFDC monthly check was $374, and the average December SSI benefit was $363 (U.S. Congress, 1998) .
The substantial size of EIC refund checks is sufficient to assist low-income consumers in purchasing big-ticket items. In this paper we ask whether there is evidence that the lumpy nature of EIC payments induces changes in expenditure patterns among recipients. In particular, we think that the EIC payment might alter the seasonal pattern of durable goods expenditure among its recipients since many big-ticket items are classified as durable goods. How and when EIC payments are used may shed some light on the effects of proposals to alter the timing of EIC disbursements and may help explain why nearly all recipients choose lump-sum disbursements. In order to address these issues, we use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) and exploit the monthly nature of the expenditure data and the concentrated payment period for EIC benefits.
Many researchers have explored the sensitivity of consumption to predictable changes in household income arising from sources other than the Earned Income Credit. Among studies looking at the effects of short-term income fluctuations on contemporaneous consumption, some, such as Paxson (1993) , find that households are not sensitive to the timing of income, while others, including Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999) , find that households do not perfectly smooth expected income. Paxson (1993) finds that seasonal consumption patterns in Thailand result from seasonal variations in preferences or prices rather than from seasonal fluctuations in income. In contrast, both Souleles (1999) and Parker (1999) find that U.S. household consumption contemporaneously increases in response to predictable increases in income. Souleles (1999) looks at the consumption effects of tax refunds generally, while Parker (1999) primarily focuses on the effect of changes in Social Security withholding within the calendar year that affect high-income households. In contrast to Parker (1999) , in particular, we look at spending among an economically disadvantaged sample. Economically disadvantaged families may respond to income changes differently both because they live closer to subsistence and because they have less access to formal financial institutions. In addition, while many other studies have been interested in testing the implications of the life cycle/ permanent-income hypothesis, we are mostly concerned about the effects of the Earned Income Credit's program features on recipient behavior.
Our research bears upon the policy decision to structure the program so that most EIC benefits are paid out in one yearly lump-sum payment, and the decision of most beneficiaries to take their entire payment in one lump-sum. In late 1999, members of Congress proposed taking EIC lump-sum payments that would normally be paid to beneficiaries in spring and distributing them in 12 monthly payments. These payments would commence after the filing of the previous year's taxes (U.S. Congress, 1999) . How this change would influence recipient families depends on how and when EIC payments are spent. If families perfectly smooth consumption forward and do not earn interest on the lump-sum payment, they would be unaffected by the congressional proposal. On the other hand, if families spend the money upon receipt, they will be negatively affected by the policy change.
Under current law, EIC recipients have the option of receiving a portion of their benefits as supplements to their paychecks during the tax year of eligibility (prior to filing taxes). This policy option, known as the Advance EIC (AEIC), has been in effect since 1979 when the Revenue Act of 1978 made the EIC a permanent program.
1 Since then, the AEIC has experienced miniscule levels of participation despite the fact that recipients ought to prefer receiving the same nominal dollar amount earlier rather than later be-cause of time value of money.
2 In 1996, 192 ,000 families received $76 million in AEIC payments, representing only 1 percent of recipient families and 0.3 percent of benefit payments (IRS, 1999) .
The decision of most recipients to take the EIC in a single payment may be due to their desire to purchase big-ticket items. This leads us to expect that the seasonality in income induced by the EIC may affect most profoundly seasonal patterns in durable goods expenditure. If individuals plan to use the EIC to fund large purchases and they have limited access to credit and to formal financial markets, recipients may be better off waiting to receive their EIC as a large check. If instead recipients desire to purchase small items, they would be better off receiving their money earlier because they could purchase these items earlier. In addition, people with savings accounts, even if they wanted to purchase a large item, would be better off receiving payments earlier because they could earn interest until the purchase occurred. However, for individuals with limited ability to store money safely and the desire to make a substantial purchase, the EIC may serve as a safe mechanism for savings. One further indication that EIC recipients lack access to formal credit networks, contributing to little interest in the AEIC, is the fact that only 21 percent of EIC recipients in tax year 1994 had any taxable interest earnings compared to 56 percent of non-EIC recipients (U.S. GAO, 1996; and IRS, 1997) .
If the EIC affects expenditure seasonality, we expect recipient households to increase expenditure soon after refund checks are received. Fortunately, refunds are received during a very concentrated portion of the calendar year. Individuals must file taxes between January 1 st and April 15 th , and the IRS reports that most refunds are sent out between four and six weeks after filing. 3 This suggests that most refund checks should be received between February 1 st and May 30 th . Data on the timing of both EIC payments where EIC exceeds tax liability (i.e., the refundable portion) and individual income tax refunds bear out this prediction. Figure 1 shows the percent of total IRS payments of each type paid out by month in 1998. The data show that the great majority of payments occur between February and May, with 92.4 percent of EIC payments and 85.0 percent of individual income tax refunds occurring during this period. The data also show that EIC refunds are received earlier than other refunds. While EIC refunds peak in February (45.6 percent) followed by March (30.1 percent), individual income tax refunds are highest in March (24.1 percent), April (23.1 percent), and May (24.1 percent). 4 In addition, we note that the graph in Figure 1 probably represents a distribution of the timing of payments that is slightly later than the distribution of the receipt of refunded dollars by tax filers. About onehalf of EIC recipients file returns completed by paid preparers (U.S. GAO, 1996) . Most professional tax preparation services offer high interest refund anticipation loans that allow filers to receive money as soon as two days after filing. Therefore, EIC recipients may well be receiving their refunds somewhat earlier than indicated in the IRS data displayed in Figure 1 .
In order to investigate whether EIC recipients spend more on all types of goods and durable goods in particular during the tax refund season, we utilize the empirical strategy of Paxson (1993) to estimate expenditure equations that allow differences in income seasonality to affect seasonal consumption patterns. The empirical model estimated is derived from an expenditure model that allows for imperfect ability to smooth consumption across seasons such that actual expenditure in each season is a weighted average of income in that season and desired expenditure in that season.
In looking for effects of the EIC on seasonal expenditure patterns, we find that the EIC leads to increased levels of expenditure during the tax-filing season. In particular, we find that EIC eligible households spend approximately 3 percent more in total during February, the modal month of EIC refunds, and 9 percent more on durable goods. This supports our conjecture that the EIC facilitates the purchasing of big-ticket items by low-income families. These estimates also suggest that EIC recipients smooth expenditure somewhat, since when we translate these increases into dollars, the average increase in expenditure is less than the average refundable EIC amount.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the data. After introducing the data, we present our model and estimation strategies. We then detail our results. In the final section, we conclude and suggest avenues for future research.
DATA DESCRIPTION
To explore the effect of the EIC on consumption seasonality, we use data from the 1982 through 1996 waves of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). The CES surveys a nationally representative sample of consumer units with questions about their monthly expenditure patterns and limited questions about their income, assets, and family structure. The CES unit of analysis, the consumer unit, is an individual or group of individuals living together who are either related by blood or legal arrangements, or who use their income to make joint expenditures in two of the three categories: housing, food, and other living expenses. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we use the terms consumer unit, family, and household interchangeably. The CES surveys consumer units four times in consecutive three month increments about their expenditure over the previous three months. 6 For example, one consumer unit may be questioned in February about expenditure in November through January, in May about expenditure in February through April, in August about expenditure in May through July, and then finally in November about expenditure in August through October. New units enter the sample every month. Most questions refer to the amount spent in each of the previous three months. However, a limited set of questions ask about the combined amount spent in the entire three month period and then record monthly amounts that are these quarterly amounts divided by three. The categories surveyed at the quarterly level include food, alcoholic beverages, gasoline and motor oil, reading, personal care, tobacco, and fees and admissions. We structure all expenditure data in a monthly format and do not adjust for the smoothing induced by dividing some quarterly totals by three. We do not believe that this is a problem because expenditure in these categories is likely to be relatively constant from month to month-a fact that in part explains why expenditure in these areas is not asked separately for each month.
7 All expenditure data are converted to 1998 dollars using the monthly personal consumption expenditure (PCE) total price index.
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Calculating EIC Eligibility and Payment Values
The CES does not ask the consumer unit any questions relating specifically to the EIC. Therefore, we need to predict the value of the EIC payments that the consumer unit is eligible to receive using data on children, earnings, and household structure. We do this using the CES "member" files that provide information on the earnings, relationship to reference person, and age of the individuals that comprise the consumer unit. The need to use the member rather than the consumer unit information arises from the fact that for families with complicated structures (which are often lower income families), the consumer unit is different from the tax-filing unit. From the member file data, we create tax-units, determine eligible children in those units, calculate tax unit earnings, and impute EIC payments based on the program schedule. The consumer unit EIC is then defined as the sum of the calculated EICs for the tax units that comprise the consumer unit.
In order to calculate tax unit earnings we use the responses to questions about member salary, non-farm, and farm income asked during the first and fourth waves of questioning. These questions refer to income during the previous twelve month period, which only corresponds to the calendar year (and tax year) if the recipient is questioned during January. We calculate earnings data that corresponds to the tax year by taking a weighted average of the earnings reported in the first and fourth interviews where the weights are based on the months for which the tax and interview year overlap. We define consumer unit member income as the sum of salary, nonfarm, and farm income. 9 Most assessments point to earnings underreporting in the CES income data. To the extent that we are underestimating earnings, we are also overestimating EIC eligibility. 6 The CES actually surveys families five times. However, data are only reported for surveys two through five.
Throughout the paper we refer to these as surveys one through four. 7 In an earlier version of the paper, we used only quarterly expenditure data. The results from that analysis were much weaker than the current results. We did not find significant effects of the EIC on expenditure seasonality. Using monthly expenditure data has much more power for identifying an effect of EIC because we avoid smoothing monthly fluctuations over three month periods. 8 A more detailed description of the data is available from the authors on request. 9 While the EIC eligibility rules depend on AGI when AGI is greater than earned income, the member files do not contain the detailed information needed to calculate AGI.
Having calculated tax unit income and the number of eligible children, we impute EIC payments for each tax unit within the consumer unit based on the EIC program schedule. We calculate EIC benefits based on our best estimate of earnings and family structure for the calendar year before the year in which we observe February expenditure. In this way, we are predicting EIC payments that will be received in the same time frame that we observe expenditure. We deviate from program rules for defining EIC eligibility in that we assume all childless workers are ineligible despite the introduction of a small credit for this group in 1994. We do this so that our EIC eligible sample represents a more homogenous recipient group with a more substantial credit.
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It is important to note that between 1982 and 1996 the EIC increased in generosity numerous times. In particular, Congress enacted major programmatic expansions in both 1990 and 1993 . Between 1990 and 1991 , the maximum credit grew by 25 percent for families with one child and by 30 percent for families with two or more children. In addition, the credit rate increased from 14 percent of earned income for all families with children to 16.7 percent for families with one child and 17.3 percent for families with more than one child. As a result, the average credit grew from $601 to $813 (nominal) per recipient family (U.S. Congress, 1998) . The second major expansion occurred between 1993 and 1994, although the changes were not fully phased in until 1996. Between 1993 and 1994, the maximum credit increased by 42 percent for households with one child and 67 percent for households with two or more children. At this time, a small credit for families without children was introduced as well. As mentioned earlier, we define these childless households as ineligible for the EIC for estimation purposes.
Consumer Unit Income
In the estimation section, income is defined as total consumer unit before tax income from the fourth interview plus imputed EIC benefit. The before-tax income measure from the "family" files is more comprehensive than the income data available from the member files that is used to calculate EIC eligibility. Unlike the member file that only contains earnings information, the family file includes measures of income from other sources such as interest income, welfare, and child support. We use the fourth interview income measure because it corresponds to income over the same horizon as the consumption data. Ideally we would be using a reliable measure of after-tax income. However, after tax income in the CES is calculated as before tax income minus reported tax payments net of refunds. Unfortunately, the measures of both tax payments and tax refunds do not appear to be accurate. In contrast to IRS reports that 70 percent of tax return filers received overpayment refunds in 1996, the CES reports positive refunds in less than 40 percent of consumer units in the same year. This underreporting of refunds in the CES appears to be especially pronounced among low-income filers. While the IRS reports positive refunds for over 70 percent of tax units with incomes below $15,000, less than 20 percent of consumer units with before tax income below $15,000 (and above $1) report any refund amount to the CES (IRS, 1998) . 11 In light of these data issues, we do not use the re- 10 We have also performed the estimates including individuals who received the small childless credit in the EIC eligible sample. The results are substantively unchanged. 11 While some of these discrepancies can be explained by the fact that not all individuals are required to file taxes, the differences are too large and persist too high into the income distribution to be explained by this fact alone. For example, there is a 30 percentage point gap in refund percentages even among individuals with incomes between $40,000 and $50,000.
fund data from the CES in our analyses. Also, we have not adjusted the income data to account for the underreporting in the CES.
Consumer Unit Expenditure
We look at consumption expenditure in three different categories: total expenditure, durable goods expenditure, and non-durable goods and services expenditure. Durable goods is comprised of expenditures on household furnishings and equipment, televisions and other home electronics, and vehicle purchases. Nondurables includes both non-durable goods and services, such as expenditures on food, clothing, and entertainment.
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Expenditures on health care, education, shelter, utilities, vehicle finance charges, vehicle insurance, and other household operations are included in the total expenditure category, but in neither durables nor non-durables. We are most interested in the big-ticket items represented in the durable goods category and will use nondurables as a comparison group. One indication that this definition of durable goods represents the big-ticket items we are most interested in is that consumer units spend less on durable goods in the average month, but durable goods expenditure has a higher standard deviation across consumer unit-months.
Summary Statistics
Variable means and standard deviations for the estimation sample are presented in Table 1 . Note that a consumer unit is labeled EIC eligible if any tax unit within the consumer unit was imputed to be eligible for any EIC amount. We drop observations with negative or zero expenditure for total expenditure, durable goods, or non-durable goods and services. In addition, we drop all consumer units with income less than or equal to zero and then we drop the consumer unit months in the bottom 3 percent of the income distribution.
13 Our final sample consists of 117,801 consumer units and 587,294 consumer-unit months. In approximately 9 percent of the remaining family-month observations, we impute that the family was EIC eligible in that year. In addition, among eligible families the average amount of the imputed credit was $844.
We present summary statistics separately by imputed EIC eligibility in Table  1 , columns 2 and 3. EIC eligibles have lower income than non-eligibles: $22,964 (1998$) versus $47,292. As expected, EIC families spend less per month on average both on durable and non-durable goods. For all families, monthly durable goods expenditure represents approximately 18 percent of total monthly expenditures while non-durable goods spending represents approximately 41 percent. Finally, while all of our EIC families have children, only 38 percent of non-eligible families have children. As a result, average family size among EIC eligible families is 3.9 persons compared to 2.6 persons for non-EIC eligible families. Among EIC eligible families, we note that average annual total expenditures are greater than average total income. This is a common feature of CES data and arises from the under-reporting of income and the exclusion of some in- 12 Our definition of non-durables includes food, alcohol, apparel and services, gasoline, other vehicle expenses, public transportation, fees and admissions, pets and toys, other entertainment, personal care, reading, tobacco, cash contributions, and personal insurance and pensions. The interpretation of the regressions below is robust to the exclusion of cash contributions and personal insurance and pensions from the non-durables category. This definition differs slightly from those used by other authors such as Lusardi (1996) . 13 If we use all households, the shape of the log function leads us to estimate an unreasonably small elasticity of consumption with respect to income; however our conclusions are not altered. We experimented with a variety of cutoffs and choose 3 percent (annual income of $1,582) because the gains in the elasticity estimates taper off at higher cutoff percents. come-support program money from the income definitions. To address this issue, we control for a number of demographic characteristics in the following regressions that may be correlated with income.
MODEL AND ESTIMATION STRATEGIES
We investigate the role of the EIC in the expenditure patterns of recipients using the model of consumption and income seasonality utilized in Paxson (1993) . Paxson begins with a perfect consumption-smoothing model and extends the model to allow for the imperfect ability of households to smooth consumption by permitting expenditure in a given period to partially track income from that period. As a result, actual expenditure by individual, i, in month, m, E im , is written as a weighted average of desired monthly expenditure, E * im , and monthly income, Y im :
where π is between 0 and 1 and measures the extent to which seasonal expenditure tracks seasonal income. When π = 0 expenditure is independent of the timing of income; when π = 1 expenditure perfectly tracks seasonal income patterns.
A key feature of Paxson's consumption smoothing model is that the allocation of consumption across months is only a function of prices and preferences. Given the assumptions that individuals face identical prices and have identical preferences, desired monthly expenditure becomes a constant fraction of income for all individuals in a given month. Let β m equal the share of annual income that all individuals wish to consume in month m: 
The β m sum to one across months and measure the effects of preferences and prices on expenditure, and the sum of A im across months equals one for each individual and reflects the timing of income. As above, if π = 0, the only determinants of the seasonal pattern of expenditure are prices and preferences.
For estimation purposes, Y i is redefined as average monthly income (total annual income divided by 12), and β m and A im are multiplied by 12 so they average one across seasons. Equation [2] may then be rewritten as follows by taking the natural logarithm:
Taking the first-order Taylor series expansion of equation [3] around β m = 1 and A im = 1 yields:
If households perfectly smooth consumption spending, the coefficient on A im will be zero.
With good information on seasonal income and expenditure, equation 
For this analysis, we also have concerns about the measurement of A im . In particular, income is only reported on a yearly basis and we do not know the month in which the EIC refund is received by a given consumer unit. However, we can predict whether a household is EIC eligible and this indication of eligibility becomes our Z. Specifically, Z i = 0 for households that are ineligible for the EIC and Z i = 1 for EIC eligible households. We utilize the following empirical specification of [6]:
E im is expenditure by individual i in month m for the given category of expenditure (durable goods, non-durable goods and services, or total). Y i is average monthly income for individual i. α 1 is the elasticity of expenditure with respect to income which we do not restrict to equal one. M is a vector of monthly dummy variables, and γ is the parameter vector of monthly effects that captures preferences, prices, and income seasonality common to all households. Specifically each element of γ is defined as γ m = (1 -π)β m + πA m -1. R is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family is EIC eligible. φ is the added monthly effect for EIC eligible families. Each element of φ is defined as φ m = πA Z m . Finally, ε im is the household-month error term. Thus, testing that short-term changes in income induced by the EIC do not affect expenditure patterns, π = 0, is equivalent to testing that the φ m are jointly insignificant.
In estimating equation [7] , we also control for year-specific fixed effects, family size, education level of the reference person, number of unmarried children under 19 years of age, region, an indicator for the sex of the reference person, and an indicator equal to one if the household head is white. For confidentiality reasons, region is not defined for consumer units residing in rural areas. In estimation, we use rural as the omitted category; therefore, the interpretation of the region effects is relative to rural households located in any region. In addition, we include a set of indicator variables for family type: husband, wife, and own children only; male parent and own children only; female parent and own children only; single persons; and other family types. We also incorporate a constant and omit September from Mγ. We choose September as the baseline month because it is a month when almost no EIC payments are made (less than 1 percent) and is also before the Christmas shopping season. Throughout, we calculate standard errors that are robust to observing the same consumer unit multiple times. In the concluding section, we discuss implications of the mismeasurement of R caused by our imputation procedure.
In the estimation section, we estimate equation [7] focussing on the coefficient estimates of the interaction between month and EIC eligibility, φ. These coefficients measure the extent to which the expenditure pattern of EIC eligible families differs from that of other families. If EIC receipt affects expenditure patterns, in other words if individuals are unable to perfectly smooth consumption, we expect the coefficients φ to be largest during the EIC refund season. Similarly, if the EIC leads to the purchase of big-ticket items, the difference in the coefficients should be greater for durable goods than for non-durable goods.
RESULTS
In Table 2 we present results for a simple regression of log expenditure (by expenditure category) on log income, a set month dummy variables, and the demographic and regional covariates described above. In addition, we include a constant and control for year fixed effects. The following categories are omitted: September; high school diploma; rural; female; non- white; and family type is husband, wife, and own children only. Note that these estimates do not include any measure of EIC eligibility.
We estimate that the elasticity of expenditure with respect to income is approximately 0.32 and find evidence of seasonality in expenditure.
14 In Figure 2 we graph the estimated monthly coefficients relative to September (the omitted month throughout the paper). Looking at the monthly pattern of total expenditure, we observe low relative levels of expenditure in the first third of the year. Total expenditure is especially low in February, a month that is both shorter than others and follows on the heels of the Christmas spending season. This is followed by increased expenditure in the summer months and a slight decline in October and November. Finally, there is a large rise in December that accompanies the Christmas season. Looking at Table 2, the coefficient on family size in column 1 indicates that a one person increase in the number of people in the family increases expenditure by 10 percent; however, each additional child within the family decreases total expenditure by 5 percent, holding family size constant. Thus, on net each child increases total spending by 5 percent. We also find that expenditure increases in educational attainment, probably reflecting permanent income as well as some of the measurement error in income. The region categories indicate that rural consumer units consume less than urban consumer units and that Midwest urban consumers spend less than urban consumers in all other regions. Households headed by a male consume 4 percent more in each month than female headed households, and not surprisingly, single female parent families consume 6
Notes: For each series we plot coefficient estimates on month dummy variables from a regression of log expenditure on log income, a set of month dummies, demographic characteristics, and year fixed effects. See Table 2 for a detailed list of the covariates. The dependent variables are log total expenditure, log durable goods expenditure, and log expenditure for non-durable goods and services. In each case, September is the omitted month. percent less than families with both parents present. In addition, house-holds headed by a white person consume 10 percent more than non-white households.
The monthly pattern of durable goods expenditure is quite similar to that for total expenditure, although the magnitudes of the coefficients tend to be larger. Durable goods purchases are also low in the first part of the year and highest in December. In fact, December expenditures are over 50 percent higher than expenditures in September. Durable goods spending also increases noticeably in May and June. Not surprisingly, the results for non-durable goods and services are nearly identical to the results for total expenditure.
The remainder of the coefficient estimates in the durable goods and nondurable goods and services regressions are similar to the coefficient estimates in the total expenditure results although durable goods expenditure is less sensitive to most of the demographic characteristics. In the remainder of the paper, we only present coefficient estimates for the monthly effects and for the interaction between the monthly effects and EIC eligibility (and in some cases other categories). In these additional regressions, the coefficient estimates for the demographic characteristics and income are broadly similar to those in these preliminary regressions.
We now turn to the results comparing non-EIC eligible households to those who are EIC eligible. Tables 3A-C present monthly effects for each of the three expenditure categories. Each table represents a different expenditure categoryTotal (Table 3A) , Durable Goods (Table  3B) , and Non-Durable Goods and Services (Table 3C) . Column 1 of each table presents the estimates of the monthly effects for the non-eligible population. Column 3 presents the additional monthly effects for the EIC population and represents the difference in expenditure in each month between the eligible and non-eligible populations. Therefore, the predicted seasonal pattern for EIC recipients is the sum of columns 1 and 3.
The bottom of each table reports the pvalues for five different tests. The first statistic reported is the p-value for the test of whether there is any seasonality in expenditure for the non-EIC population: The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly total expenditure. In addition to the covariates listed above, the regression also includes all covariates included in the regressions presented in Table 2 . There are 587,294 consumer unit-month observations. Standard errors are Huber/White standard errors allowing for dependence within consumer units. All dollar values are in real 1998 dollars.
Test 1:
No seasonality in non-EIC recipients p = 0.000
No seasonality in EIC recipients p = 0.000
No difference in seasonality EIC/Non-EIC p = 0.000 Test 4:
Constant difference in monthly effects EIC/Non-EIC p = 0.000 Test 5:
Constant difference in monthly effects EIC/Non-EIC Jan-Oct p = 0.000
We are testing whether all the γ m equal zero with September being the omitted month. The second statistic is the p-value for the test of whether there is any seasonal pattern in expenditure for the EIC population:
. . = φ 9 = γ 10 = φ 10 = . . . = γ 12 + φ 12 = 0. The third statistic is the p-value for the test of whether there is a difference in expenditure seasonality between the EIC and non-EIC populations:
In other words, are the coefficient estimates for the month-EIC eligibility interactions jointly insignificant? If there is no difference in the monthly effects between EIC and non-EIC families (we fail to reject the null hypothesis), then we would be unable to argue that the EIC is affecting seasonal expenditure patterns. The fourth statistic is for the test of whether the difference in monthly expenditure between the EIC and non-EIC population is constant over the entire year:
This tests whether the pattern of expenditure for EIC and non-EIC families is the same across months without requiring that the level of expenditure, controlling for other characteristics, be identical. This may be a better test of the effect of the EIC than test three if we have omitted variables such as those that capture differences in how consumer units allocate expenditure between durable goods and non-durable goods and services. The fifth test statistic is for the test of whether this difference in monthly expenditure is constant from January-October. We construct the final test statistic in order to determine whether there are non-constant differences in monthly expenditure excluding the effects of Christmas. We are most interested in these final two test statistics because if we can reject that the difference in the expenditure patterns is constant, we may be observing an EIC induced change in expenditure patterns. As displayed in Table 3A , for total expenditure, we find evidence of strong seasonality in expenditure for all households, similar to that presented in Table 2 and Figure 2 . We also easily reject the hypothesis that there is no expenditure seasonality for EIC eligible households (test 2). Our results show that the seasonal pattern for EIC recipients is different from the pattern for non-recipients. This is evident in the p-value of 0.000 for the third test. More importantly, we can also reject that the monthly differences in expenditure between the two populations are constant over the entire year or constant for the first ten months of the year.
Three particular months stand out when assessing the differences between the EIC eligible and non-eligible populations in these total expenditure estimates. First, while EIC eligible households spend an average of 3 percent less per month (the average of the twelve coefficients), they spend 6 percent less than other households in June and 5 percent less in July. This may be because the income of EIC recipients limits their ability to take vacations or buy cars, two activities that are concentrated in the spring and summer months. Second, EIC eligible households spend the same amount in February as other consumers. Additional tests (not shown in the paper) demonstrate that EIC recipients consume more in February, relative to non-recipients, than in any other month. This may be the result of expenditure patterns induced by the EIC. As discussed above, February is the modal month of EIC refund payments. The other major EIC months, March and April, appear to be more typical although the coefficients are next highest after February. These suggestive results will be investigated in more detail below.
In Table 3B we present results for durable goods. For durable goods, we also see evidence of differential expenditure seasonality among EIC recipients relative to non-recipients. As above, we easily reject all five of our test statistics. We see that EIC eligible households spend more on durables in February than in any other month relative to non-eligible house-holds. The February difference stands out more for durable goods than it does for total expenditure with a difference between eligibles and non-eligibles of 5 percent relative to an average difference of -4 percent (the average of the twelve interaction coefficients). The only other months in which we see EIC eligibles spending more than non-eligibles are March (0.2 percent) and April (3 percent). We can reject that the difference in February is equal to the difference in each other month (at the 99 percent level) except March and April. This provides support for our hypothesis that the EIC may induce increased durable goods spending. EIC recipients appear to concentrate a higher portion of their durable goods spending during the concentrated period when most EIC payments are received. For durable goods, we also see a pronounced difference in expenditure in December with spending 15 percent lower among EIC eligible households than noneligible households. We think it is unlikely that lower December expenditure is caused by EIC receipt, and as is shown below, this affect is attenuated when we allow for seasonality by income level and child status.
The pattern for non-durable expenditure, displayed in Table 3C , is similar to that for total expenditure. We continue to see high relative spending levels in February among EIC eligible households and lower relative levels in June and July. For non-durables, the coefficient estimate on the February-EIC interaction is slightly less exceptional than was the case for durable goods with a difference in expenditure of 2 percent, relative to an average difference of -1 percent. However, we can reject that the February effect equals that in each other month at standard levels of significance with the exceptions of August and December.
While the EIC may induce the expenditure patterns we observe in February for all three categories of expenditure and in February through April for durable goods spending, other factors correlated with EIC eligibility, namely children and income, may be related to seasonal preferences in expenditure. If this is the case, the coefficients on EIC eligibility are partially capturing these differences in preferences. In addition, it is possible that there are systematic differences in income seasonality between EIC eligible households and other households due to factors other than EIC receipt. In particular, the seasonal income pattern for poorer families may differ from that of more well-to-do families. If this is the case and the difference in income seasonality corresponds to the timing of EIC receipt, then we may be assigning causality incorrectly to the EIC. We explore both of these issues below.
Differences in Income Seasonality and Preferences
Two possible reasons for the difference between EIC and non-EIC families in their monthly expenditure are differences in seasonal preferences for spending and differences in income seasonality. The specification of equation [7] assumes that seasonal preferences, as represented by γ, are constant across all families and that the only difference in income seasonality arises through the EIC.
EIC families are different from other families in two major ways that may be correlated with preferences. First, EIC eligible families are much more likely to have children (see Table 1 ). Second, in order to receive EIC, families must have income below a certain threshold. As a result, EIC eligible families are, on average, much poorer than non-eligible families. We think it may be possible that families with children or with low-income have different seasonal spending preferences than other families. For example, families with children may wish to purchase more in the back to school shopping season (August) than families without children.
In addition to having different preferences for monthly expenditure patterns, low-income families may have different income seasonality. There are other forms of income seasonality observed during a calendar year in addition to that induced by the earned income credit. Other forms of tax refunds, particularly Federal tax overpayment refunds, are also mostly paid out between February and April, and most tax filers receive a refund. In 1996, approximately 70 percent of filers received an average refund of $1,335. While this is a substantial sum, it only amounts to approximately 3.5 percent of average adjusted gross income among all filers. In contrast, the 1996 average refundable portion of the EIC of $1,506 represented over 10 percent of AGI among EIC recipients, and EIC refunds were nearly 15 percent of AGI for those EIC recipients with incomes below $20,000. As mentioned earlier, we do not use the refund data from the CES in our analyses, but the presence of these other refunds is important to keep in mind.
A second potential source of income seasonality is seasonality in earnings from employment. In order to look at the pattern of earnings over the calendar year, we investigate the monthly pattern of earnings using the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) files from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), 1995 and 1996. These years are chosen because they are in the middle of the current expansion and the data are unlikely to be confounded by business cycle effects. We estimate separate regressions for households with annual incomes above and below $30,000, regressing log income on a series of monthly dummies (excluding September). Figure 3 shows the monthly dummy coefficients from these two regressions. The earnings measure is earnings last week.
15 15 The sample used is the earnings sample of the outgoing rotation group files. This sample excludes individuals who do not work any hours in the week prior to the interview. Variation in the probability of positive hours causes income variability that is not captured in these estimates. As such, we also look at monthly variation in the probability of working during the week prior to the interview. We find that higher income workers are less likely to work positive hours during the summer months. Lower income workers have much less seasonal variation in the probability of working positive hours. Individuals in neither income category have distinctive seasonal variation that corresponds with the tax refund season suggesting that seasonality in income is not correlated with EIC refund payments.
Notes: The graph shows the monthly coefficient estimates from regressions of log earnings on a series of month dummies. The separate regressions are for individuals with annual income above and below $30,000. In both cases, September is the omitted month. The data are from the Outgoing Rotation Group files of the Current Population Survey, 1995 and 1996. There are two patterns that emerge from these figures. First, while there is some earnings seasonality, especially among low-income workers, it follows a pattern quite distinct from that induced by the EIC. In particular, the earnings of low-income workers peak during the summer and fall months and are low during spring and December. Second the income change induced by the EIC dwarfs these other income changes. We conclude that differences in income seasonality between low and high-income individuals are unlikely to generate the seasonal differences observed in the expenditure regressions. That said, in the next set of regressions we allow for expenditure differences by income level that will capture both preference differences as well as the potential for systematic differences in income seasonality.
We address the potential for preferences to be correlated with income and child status by simultaneously allowing lowincome households and households with children to have different seasonal spending patterns. In particular, we re-estimate equation [7] , including a series of monthchild interactions and month-low-income interactions. The new estimation equation is as follows:
As above, R is the measure of EIC eligibility. Child equals one if there are any unmarried children under 19 years of age living in the consumer unit. Low-income equals one if the consumer unit income is in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution (below $29,032 per year). The vector κ represents the marginal monthly effects of having children in the household while η represents the marginal effects of being low-income.
We present the results from these regressions, separately by expenditure category, in Tables 4 A-C. The first column presents the coefficients on the month dummies. The second column presents the added monthly effects for EIC eligible households. The third column presents the added monthly effect for households with unmarried children under age 19. The final column presents the added monthly effect for low-income households.
For total expenditure, we observe that families with children spend an average of 8 percent more in each month than families without children (the average of the coefficient estimates in column 3). Two months stand out from these results: August and December. In both of these months, families with children spend 12 percent more than families without children. These tables also show that low-income households spend 2 percent less on average than higher income households (the average of the coefficient estimates in column 4). This difference is especially pronounced in December, during which low-income households spend 7 percent less. In both cases, the February effect is about average, indicating that different seasonal expenditure preferences among low-income households and households with children are not driving the effects presented in Table 3A . This is confirmed by February continuing to be the largest coefficient estimate in column 2. While EIC families consume 4 percent less on average per month than non-EIC families controlling for the child-and low-income-month interactions, in February they consume only 1 percent less. At the bottom of Table 4A , we present five test statistics. Based on test one, we reject that there is no seasonality in expenditure for the base group (non-eligible, childless, higher-income households). In tests two, four, and five, we reject that there is no difference in monthly effects between the base group and the EIC-eligible, house-holds with children, and low-income households, respectively. In test three, we reject that there is a constant difference in monthly effects between EIC-eligible families and the base group.
For durable goods (Table 4B) , as was the case for total consumption, we find that households with children spend more in December relative to households without children, while low-income households spend relatively less in December than higher-income households. The other months, including February, are much less remarkable than December. For the EIC interactions, the February effect continues to be the largest; while EIC recipients spend 5 percent less than non-recipients in the average month, they spend 5 percent more in February. In addition, we find that EIC eligible households spend only 1 percent less in March. For durable goods, we perform the same set of tests as we did for total expenditure and continue to reject easily the null hypothesis in each case. Most importantly, we can reject that EIC recipients have the same monthly expen- The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly total expenditure. In addition to the covariates listed above, the regression includes all covariates included in the regressions presented in Table 2 . A consumer unit is defined as having a child if there is an unmarried child under 18 living in the unit. A consumer unit is defined as low-income if total income for the unit is in the bottom 40 percent of the sample. There are 587,294 consumer unit-month observations. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are Huber/White standard errors allowing for dependence within consumer units.
Test 1:
No seasonality in base group (non-low-income, non-EIC recipients, no children) p = 0.000 Test 2:
No difference in month effects EIC/base group p = 0.000 Test 3:
Constant difference in monthly effects EIC/base group p = 0.004 Test 4:
No difference in month effects consumer units with children/base group p = 0.000
No difference in month effects low income consumer units/base group p = 0.000 diture pattern as non-recipients and that the difference in monthly effects is constant. For non-durable goods (Table 4C) , we find that households with children spend 3 percent more than households without children in the average month. Notably, however, they spend 9 percent more than households without children in August and 10 percent more in December. These increases in August and December may be the result of higher spending for back to school merchandise and Christmas gifts among families with children. Low-income households spend an average of 6 percent less per month than higher-income households but 10 percent less in December. This decrease in December may reflect that lower-income households are not able to increase Christmas spending as much as higher-income households. Turning to the EIC coefficients, we continue to see that EIC eligible households have the highest relative consumption in February. Finally, we once again easily reject all five hypotheses.
As shown in the results in Tables 4 A-C, the larger relative size of the February and March interaction coefficient estimates in the regressions presented in Tables 3 A-C cannot be explained by preferences or income seasonality correlated with the lowincome or child status of eligible families. However, we find that some of the lower No difference in month effects low income consumer units/base group p = 0.000 December expenditure among EIC households can be explained by lower levels of Christmas spending among families of limited means. Before concluding, we look at the effects of EIC on expenditure from one additional angle by taking advantage of the program expansions that have taken place since 1982.
Program Expansions
If EIC receipt, rather than the combination of being low income and having children, is causing the expenditure pattern observed in the data, we expect to observe different expenditure patterns for households that were eligible when sampled than for households that were not eligible when sampled but would be eligible under the new program rules. Similarly, the effect of the EIC on expenditure seasonality should become more pronounced as the program's generosity increases.
To address the first of theses ideas, we take advantage of the EIC program changes by comparing families that received the EIC with the set of families with children that would have received the EIC in 1995, but were ineligible in the year in which they were sampled. These families are low-income but had earnings above No difference in month effects low income consumer units/base group p = 0.000 the phase-out ending income in the year in which they were sampled. We examine this by estimating the following equation:
where E 1995 = 1 if the consumer unit is eligible for the EIC under 1995 rules independent from whether it is EIC eligible when sampled. The vector ψ represents the marginal difference of being EIC eligible under 1995 rules relative to being ineligible under the 1995 rules, independent of the eligibility of the consumer unit in the year in which it was sampled. The parameter φ represents the additional effect of actually being eligible when sampled. If the EIC affects expenditure we expect to see a seasonal pattern in the φ parameters that corresponds to the timing of the EIC. However, we expect that any seasonal pattern in the ψ parameters will not correspond to the timing of the EIC. The results for equation [9] are presented in Tables 5A-C. We show three sets of monthly interactions. Column 1 shows the expenditure pattern of all families, γ, column 3 shows the marginal effect of being eligible according to the 1995 rules, ψ, and column 5 shows the marginal effect of being EIC eligible when sampled, φ. At the bottom of each of the tables we present three test statistics. First, we test whether individuals eligible under 1995 program rules have different expenditure patterns from the ineligible, ψ = 0. Second we test whether there is a difference in monthly effects between those eligible according to 1995 program parameters and those eligible when observed in the sample, φ = 0. Finally, we test whether this difference between monthly effects for the eligible according to the 1995 rules and eligible when sampled is constant.
For total expenditure, we reject the first of our hypotheses and marginally reject the second. We fail to reject that the difference in the monthly effects for the eligible when sampled relative to the eligible under 1995 rules is a constant. We find that the marginal effect of being interviewed in a year in which you are eligible relative to being eligible under 1995 rules is largest in February, but we cannot reject that it equals the coefficient estimates for a number of other months.
For durable goods expenditure, we can easily reject our first hypothesis and marginally reject the second; however, we cannot reject the test of constant difference between eligible under 1995 rules and eligible when sampled. We continue to see the strongest effect of eligibility in February. The results for non-durable goods and services are very similar to the results for total expenditure.
In sum, we find weaker results when we compare all families who would have been eligible under the 1995 rules to those families who were eligible when sampled. In particular, we cannot reject that the coefficients on the interactions between month, eligible according to 1995 rules, and eligible when sampled are constant. However, if we look at the monthly patterns, for the group that is eligible when sampled (the sum of the coefficient estimates in columns 3 and 5), we still observe that the eligible when sampled have larger relative levels of consumption in February. Coefficient estimates for households eligible under 1995 rules (column 3) do not have this same pattern. Together, these results suggest that EIC receipt affects expenditure patterns but that we lack sufficient statistical power to identify the effect.
Next, we take advantage of the increasing maximum credit by looking at whether the expenditure pattern is different among EIC recipients before and after the program expansions that occurred between 1990 and 1991. We expect that expenditure will be more responsive to EIC receipt in the later years when the benefits are more generous. The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly total expenditure. In addition to the covariates listed above, the regression includes all covariates included in the regressions presented in Table 2 . There are 587,294 consumer unit-month observations. Standard errors are Huber/White standard errors allowing for dependence within consumer units. and 1990, the average credit was $549 (1998$) while between 1991 and 1996 the average credit was $1,197 (1998$) (U.S. Congress, 1998) . In order to look at the effect of the expansion in generosity on expenditure patterns, we add a set of monthly interactions that allow the seasonal pattern of expenditure to differ across EIC recipients before and after the 1991 expansions. The new estimation equation is:
where Year > 1990 is an indicator variable equal to one if the consumer unit is observed after 1990 and τ is a vector of additional monthly effects arising from being EIC eligible after 1990. The results for the three expenditure categories are presented in Tables 6A-C . Here, we use a slightly different set of test statistics that focus on the difference between EIC families before and after the expansions. Test one is a test of whether there is any difference between the two eligible groups, i.e., are the coefficients on the Month-Eligibility-Year interactions, τ, jointly equal to zero? Test two is a test of whether this difference is constant, i.e., are all the τ's equal (but not necessarily equal to zero)?
For total expenditure we can reject that there is no difference between the effects of EIC during the two time periods and can marginally reject that the difference is constant. The February coefficient estimate in column 5 is the largest and is significantly different from that in all other months at the 10 percent level except for March and July.
For durable goods, we can easily reject both tested hypotheses: no difference between the effect of EIC during the two time periods and a constant difference between the two time periods. From these results, we can see that the increase in February and March spending observed in the earlier results is being driven by the expenditure patterns of EIC eligible households in the later program years. In particular, we do not observe February or March effects for EIC recipients before 1991 (see the results in column 3); however, the additional marginal effect for February is substantial and statistically significant for EIC recipients in the post-1990 period. The March effect in the post-1990 period is smaller but also positive. Post-1990 EIC families spend 13 percent more in February on durable goods and 4 percent more in March than pre-1990 eligible families. In the average month, post-1990 EIC families spend 5 percent less.
In the case of non-durable expenditures, we can reject that there is no difference in the monthly effects for pre-and post-1990 families but cannot reject that their difference is constant. In contrast to the durable goods results, for nondurables the pre-1990 period February coefficient estimate for all EIC recipients is among the largest of all the monthly effects. That said, the overall nondurables monthly pattern for pre-1990 EIC eligibles does not as clearly suggest an EIC expenditure effect as some other results presented. More similar to the durable goods results, the additional marginal February effect for post-1990 EIC recipients is the largest of the additional monthly effects. In addition, it is the only positive coefficient estimate.
16
This investigation into changes in expenditure induced by expansions in the EIC lends further credence to our hypothesis that the EIC increases spending during the month when most EIC payments are received. One conclusion we can draw Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly total expenditure. In addition to the covariates listed above, the regression includes all covariates included in the regressions presented in Table 2 . There are 587,294 consumer unit-month observations. Standard errors are Huber/White standard errors allowing for dependence within consumer units. from these results is that the seasonal expenditure effect of the EIC is measurable exclusively in the post 1990 period when the EIC program is more generous.
Assessing Magnitudes
The results point to the conclusion that the EIC leads to increased spending on durable goods and to a lesser extent nondurable goods and services during the month of February, the most common month for EIC refunds during the most recent and most generous years of the EIC. Based on the results presented in Table 3B , we find that for durable goods, the EIC increases February expenditure for all eligible families by 9 percent (a coefficient of 0.05 relative to an average coefficient of -0.04). According to Table 6B , this breaks down into no increase for families eligible before 1991 (a coefficient of -0.016 relative to an average coefficient of -0.021) and an increase of 18 percent for families eligible after 1990 (a sum of coefficients of 0.115 relative to an average sum of -0.069). For non-durable goods and services, based on Table 3C , EIC eligibility increases expenditures by 3 percent. This breaks down into an increase of 2 percent prior to 1990 and 5 percent after 1990. Similarly for total expenditures, presented in Table 3A , EIC eligibility increases spending by 3 percent. This corresponds to an increase of 1 percent prior to 1990 and 5 percent after 1990 according to Table 6A results.
If we assume that the EIC increases durable goods expenditure by 9 percent, non-durable goods and services expenditure by 3 percent, and total expenditure by 3 percent, these increases translate into February spending increases by EIC eligible families of $33, $25, and $63, respectively. If we further assume that of the $844 average estimated EIC payment, 76 percent is refunded (the average refundable portion over the 1982-97 period) and 46 percent is paid out in February this yields an average expected payment among EIC recipients of $295 in February. A comparison between these two calculations suggests that EIC recipients are spending about one-fifth of their refunds in the month in which the refund is received.
We believe that the estimate that families spend approximately one-fifth of their EIC refund in February may be biased downward due to imperfect EIC imputation. We know that some of the families imputed as EIC eligible are not actually receiving the EIC. This could be due either to their failure to file taxes or fill out the necessary schedule or to the underreporting of income in the CES. Income underreporting implies that some families with earnings above the ending income of the phase-out range report earnings in the eligible range to the CES. For these non-recipient families, the EIC should have no effect on their income seasonality and therefore no induced effect on their expenditure pattern. By including them in the eligible group we are underestimating the effects of the EIC on expenditure.
IMPLICATIONS
Our results suggest that EIC receipt induces a change in seasonal expenditure patterns. In particular, we observe an increase in February expenditure relative to that in other months with results that are strongest for durable goods. These results suggest that EIC recipients do not smooth expenditure perfectly. However, the evidence also implies that recipients spend less than the full amount of their refund in the month of receipt. In effect, some smoothing does occur.
Our finding that EIC recipients spend approximately one-fifth of the refundable portion of the EIC during the month of receipt suggests that if the advance EIC were costless, the average EIC household would be better off taking the advance EIC. This is true even if recipient house-holds are relying on the refundable portion as a forced savings mechanism. We draw this conclusion since the AEIC only allows employers to remit up to 60 percent of the total EIC as a supplement to pay. As a result, it would seem that households could use the non-advance, refundable portion of the EIC as a savings mechanism while using the AEIC to greater smooth their income. As discussed earlier the AEIC is not costless because of the basic paperwork required exacerbated by the greater employment instability among its targeted beneficiaries. Thus, any policy changes to reduce the costs of receiving the AEIC may lead to increases in its takeup rate and improved welfare for EIC recipient households.
Our results also have some implications for a plan considered by Congress in the fall of 1999. Congressional Republicans proposed to pay out EIC benefits in twelve monthly installments following the filing of taxes rather than as a lump-sum refund. The finding that EIC eligible households appear to be engaging in some consumption smoothing with their EIC payments does not imply that this plan to smooth benefit payments would advantage low-income households. In particular, the congressional plan would have served only to delay payments to beneficiaries. In addition, to the extent EIC recipients choose to use the EIC as a forced savings mechanism, they would lose the option of doing so.
The work in this paper shows that income seasonality caused by EIC receipt leads to changes in seasonal expenditure patterns particularly for durable goods. In future work we hope to expand this analysis to look at narrower categories of expenditure. In this way, we hope to understand better the specific ways in which EIC refunds are spent. In addition, we plan to investigate measures of savings and credit to determine what mechanisms facilitate consumption smoothing observed in the data.
